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Abstract
NEGOTIATED COMMISIONS AND THE THIRD MARKET
The fixed commission structure on the NYSE has changed dramatically
during the 1970' s culminating in completely negotiated commissions in
May, 1975. Because the third market prospered with fixed commissions
it is important to determine what has happened to this market since the
comnission structure changed. The results reported here Indicate the
prophets of doom have been correct so far, but there are signs of stability.
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NEGOTIATED COMMISSIONS AND THE THIRD MARKET*
Frank K. Rellly**
INTRODUCTION
From the day of its founding in 1792 until the 1960's, the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) had an established policy of minimum commissions which its
members could charge customers for the execution of orders of all sizes on
the Exchange. In December, 1968 the schedule was slightly modified to allow
quantity discounts to very large orders. In the 1970's, at the behest of the
SEC, the principle of minimum commissions was gradually eliminated. Specif-
ically, in April, 1971 the commissions on all orders over $500,000 became
negotiated. Subsequently, in April, 1972 the commission on all orders over
$300,000 became negotiated. Finally, on May 1, 1975 ("May Day"), the
minimum rate structure was abolished entirely—commissions on all trades be-
came fully negotiated.
Prior to May Day there were extensive discussions of the potential effect
this change in commission structure would have on various segments of the
securities industry. A major concern was the effect of this change on the
"Third Market." The third market is the trading of listed securities on
the over-the-counter market by non-meiier brokerage firms. Observers were
concerned for the third market because this segment of the industry had
experienced rapid grov/th and prosperity during the latter half of the 1960*8
and the early 1970 's at the expense of the NYSE simply because of the min-
imum commission schedule. Specifically, the third market grew because there
*The author acknowledges the comments by Donald Weeden, the assistance
of Young Kim, R.on Peterson, and especially Paul Skelton, and the use of the
computer facilities at the University of Illinois.
**Professor of Finance, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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2was an Increase In the trading by institutions and the commission charge for
large trades on the third market was substantially lower than the cost on the
NYSE with its minimum commission schedule that did not adequately allow for
the economies of scale in trading. These large trades included "blocks"
(10,000 shares or more), but also Included many orders by institutions of
under 10,000 shares. In addition, the market-making by dealers on the third
market Improved substantially over time in terms of the depth and liquidity
of the markets for stocks with active institutional following. Finally, the
third market benefitted because third market trades were not reported on the
tape. This lack of publicity was considered desirable by some institutions
buying or selling a block—especially if they were contemplating a sub-
sequent transaction. In summary, the third market experienced substantial
growth since 1965 for three reasons, the greatest of which was the lower com-
mission costs. The question of concern then was, what would be the effect
of fully negotiated rates on the third market since the market would lose its
greatest advantage? In addition, the third market lost its secrecy ad-
vantage in June, 1975. At that time the consolidated tape that reported
trades for all stocks on the NYSE was implemented and includes third market
trades. Therefore, many observers have hypothesized that third market
volume would decline as a percent of NYSE volume.
In contrast to the prophets of doom, conversations with institutional
portfolio managers following the change Indicated that the outlook may not
be as bad as initially expected. It was contended that commission charges
on the third market were "competitive" with the negotiated rates on the
exchanges and the market-making by third market dealers was quite good in
An article that briefly discusses this point as applied to a major third
market dealer is, Pamela Archbold, "What Weeden Is Doing to Survive," Insti-
tutional Investor , Vol. 8, No. 11 (November, 1974), p. 51.
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terms of liquidity and depth. One might also be encouraged by a study of
2
the effect of the change in NYSE fee structure in December, 1968. Specifically,
in December, 1968 the NYSE revised its fee structure to permit discounts for
large block trades. The analysis by Fredman and Johnson indicated no adverse
effects on the percent of trading on the third market. In fact, the percent
of trading on the third market was substantially higher a year after the
change
.
Given the importance of the third market to the total capital market
complex and the differing opinion regarding the effects of negotiated com-
missions, this study examines the recent history of the third market since
data became available in 1965 to the present. The emphasis is on the
periods surrounding the changes in commission rates since 1971: April, 1971;
April, 1972; and May, 1975.
THIRD MARKET COMPARED TO TOTAL NYSE VOLUME
Table 1 contains figures that indicate the ratio of third market
volume in NYSE listed stocks to total NYSE volume (share volume and dollar
value of trading) , from the beginning of 1965 through the fourth quarter of
1976. These data are reported quarterly in the SEC Statistical Bulletin .
A time series plot of the two series is contained in Figure 1.
Notably, the percent of trading in dollar terms is always larger than
the share percent. This is because the bulk of trading on the third market
is in stocks with institutional interest and the prices on these institutional
stocks are above the average price of all stocks on the NYSE.
2
Albert J. Fredman and Clarke C. Johnson, "Effect of New NYSE Fee
Structure on the Third Market," Financial Executive , Vol. 38, No. 10 (October,
1970), pp. 18-23.
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4The three quarters of interest {.lll\\llll\2nb) are starred in the table
and there are arrows on the chart. The first change to negotiated rates
came during the second quarter of 1971 and apparently had little or no
effect. Specifically, the percent of trading on the third market continued
to increase steadily during the subsequent two quarters. There was a small
decline during the third quarter followed by an increase. Clearly, the per-
cent of trading on the third market a year after the commission change was
substantially higher than during the quarter of the change (i.e., 7.8 percent
versus 6.8 percent in shares and 9 percent versus 7.9 percent in dollar value
of trading) . These results are consistent with those reported by Fredman and
Johnson.
The second change came during the second quarter of 1972 and apparently
had little or no initial effect. During the quarter of the change the per-
cent of trading on the third market increased and the percent rose again during
the following quarter. The figures indicate a delayed effect because the
percent of trading dropped drastically during the fourth quarter of 1972.
There was a small recovery (in share percent) during the first quarter of 1973,
followed by steady declines during the subsequent two quarters. Overall, it ap-
pears the second change in the commission structure had a delayed effect,
but the effect was clearly detrimental to the relative trading activity
on the third market.
The third and final change in the commission structure came during the
second quarter of 1975. During the quarter of the change both the share and
dollar ratios Increased slightly. For the subsequent three quarters the
ratios declined steadily followed by a small recovery during 2/76 and then
further declines. By the fourth quarter of 1975 the chare ratio was below
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5A percent and the dollar ratio was below 5 percent. Therefore, it appears
that the final change In the commission structure continued to have an
adverse effect on the third market as shown by its relative volume that
declined to its lowest point since the fourth quarter of 1968.
In summary, the analysis of trends in third market volume as a percent
of NYSE volinne indicates that the initial change to negotiated rates on
trades above $500,000 had no effect on the third market. In contrast, the
second change to negotiated commissions on trades over $300,000 had a delayed
effect, but the ultimate effect appeared to be adverse to the third market
and the impact was substantial. Finally, this adverse impact continued
after the change to fully negotiated commissions.
THIRD MARKET COMPARED TO INSTITUTIONAL TRADING
As noted earlier, the bulk of trading on the third market is by
institutions. Therefore, in addition to an analysis of third market
trading compared to total NYSE volume, it seems appropriate to consider
third market trading relative to the trading by its major customers—i.e.,
the institutions. This analysis is in two parts. The first part compares
third market volume to block trading volume while the second part compares
the dollar value of trading on the third market to the dollar volume of
purchases and sales by institutions.
Third Market Relative to Block Trading
Table 2 contains the ratio of third market share volume to block share
volume on the NYSE. The subsequent column reports third market dollar
volume to the dollar volume of block trading on the NYSE. The trend in
the ratio is of interest because most third market trading is by institutions
and likewise almost all block trading on the NYSE is by institutions.
Jil-'^' i . 1:.-:-^iJi| <
.Vhi-' -
::o,-J •jtn^JLO^' ..),-.:
: t... -1. -3
:1 'rrri'-'.^
j..;. .i.i.
^^=i--;ii!>.
1. ..
:-jJ-ri;r . /:::' •il.T,;^.-
•:".i:ii:
-i'lXi;'' Ivj .:") 7i,[ jot!-,:. l-;^_.-!.i:oV,L:.i,i'; ..^^^'j .V7..:;in;:;
l.i^^Srf }.: :."i,I-..:/i: ) •;;:; i.vj. .-ai Yiv ?to
'[:IQA>iJ' lAri'
= n' rug.^jiu;:
;! ; I'
; ,.:;;i„^r!_^ ; v.:
J-:i' ."' !•'>::.
.
;
' C-'^
'.••• :-'V.-!
•
ui^^^r.
••'•1
'in*
'J ; 1IT-.
lOv .. . .:.o:. . IJJ Ol :•;>' i,i'' ;'!.^[..
'ir? !::
-oirj'. '. ;::::
i\ir<: lijj
f:- 'KF
O'-pd': •i:iCj!^ -,z .jiHijio'- '.isnp. ;a,-':/
-ii\ ;;-iJi!:J
• '..]'• l' *!"
:.L->!. '. y, ;!.; ;.;:•
-
- 1 , i-'. —' { I •
-.•>i>.j'^'' :>•- ''.
:<,i ,.-•;.
.,:.;; iJ;; 't' ': afo
6Again, the dollar ratios are consistently higher than the share ratios
which indicates that third market trading is generally in higher priced
shares than the average price of shares included in block trades on the NYSE.
Notably, the spread has been narrowing over time although the series are
always parallel.
The figures in Table 2 and the time series plot of the two series con-
tained in Figure 2 incidate a dramatic decline in the ratio during the period
1965 to the beginning of 1969. An analysis of the individual series in-
dicates that this decline was not due to a lack of growth in third market
volume, but was caused by a dramatic growth in block trading. Specifically,
during the period 1965 to 1969, third market trading increased about 350
percent, but block trading increased over 1,000 percent.
An examination of the period following the first change in 1971 indicates
no adverse effects for the third market—both ratios are higher during the
second quarter of 1972 than the second quarter of 1971. Following the second
change in 1972 there was a definite effect as the ratios declined steadily
for the next three quarters followed by an increase and then another decline.
There were two increases (in 4/73 and 1/74) again followed by a series of
steady declines through the first quarter of 1975. Interestingly, there
was a small increase during the second quarter of 1975 when the final change
came. Following the final change to fully competitive rates the ratios
declined and finished the year 1976 at the lowest ratio recorded during the
total period except for the ratio during the third quarter of 1976.
In summary, an analysis of third market volume (share and dollar
volume) relative to block trading volume on the NYSE generated results that
were consistent with the prior analysis of third market volume relative to
total trading volume on the NYSE. There was a very sharp decline in the ratio
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7during the Initial periods in 1965 and 1966 because of the very rapid growth
in block trading. An examination of the specific periods surrounding the
three major changes in the commission structure indicated rw adverse effect
following the first change in April, 1971. In fact, the ratios were higher
a year later. In contrast, there were clearly adverse effects following the
last two changes. Except for three quarters when there were some increases,
the ratios declined steadily to end 1976 at the lowest points on the chart.
These results were consistent with the results when third market volume was
compared to overall NYSE volume.
Third Market Relative to Institutional Purchases and Sales
The SEC has a quarterly series of common stock transactions by selected
financial institutions including private noninsured pension funds, open-end
investment companies, life insurance companies, and property-liability
Insurance companies. An analysis of third market dollar volume compared to
transactions for this group of institutions should provide another indication
of the effect of the change in the commission structure on third market
volume as it relates to a major customer of the third market. The figures
are contained in Table 2 and a time series plot of the ratio is in Figure 3.
Again, some of the ratios during the early period are heavily influenced
by the relative growth rates for the individual series. This caused a major
decline in the ratio during 1965 and 1966, and the ratio remained below 9
percent until mid-1969. Subsequently there was a strong increase from the
latter part of 1969 to the first quarter of 1971. During the quarter of the
initial change in commission structure the ratio declined dramatically. Sub-
sequently the ratio increased and during all of the following four quarters
it was much higher than during the quarter of the change.
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8The second change during the second quarter of 1972 was followed by a
small Increase during the third quarter. Subsequently the ratio declined
drastically and was below the second quarter, 1972 ratio during the next
five quarters.
At the tiiie cf t'.afinal change (2/75), the ratio was somewhat below
the ratio in 1972. The ratio generally declined except for a sharp re-
covery during 1/76 and ended 1976 at a ratio that prevailed in 1970.
Therefore, after one takes account of the increase of the ratio prior
to any of the commission changes, the results are generally similar to the
results from the prior two comparisons. Again, the first change appeared
to have no effect. In contrast there was a definite decline in the ratio
after the second change that generally continued for five quarters. Finally,
since "May Day" the ratio has almost always been below the ratio that pre-
vailed during the quarter of the change.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Summary
The absolute and relative amount of trading on the third market grew
steadily from 1965 into 1972. This growth was attributable to lower com-
missions than on the NYSE because of the fixed commission schedule, secrecy
of reporting trades, and good market-making. Notably, the commission
advantage declined since 1971 and disappeared in 1975. Also with the
introduction of the consolidated tape the secrecy advantage was lost.
Therefore some observers have contended that the third market would decline
in relative importance.
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9Three comparisons were made of relative third market volume since 1965
with an emphasis on the periods surrounding the three changes in 1971, 1972,
and 1975. The analysis of third market volume relative to NYSE volume
indicated that the first change in the commission structure in 1971 had no
effect on the relative position of the third market. In fact, the relative
volume on the third market increased during the subsequent year. After the
second change the effect appeared to be somewhat delayed, but within a couple
of quarters the relative volume turned do'nm and continued to decline. Fol-
lowing "May Day" relative volume on the third market continued to decline
and ended 1976 at a level about half of its peak ratic . - J.S 72
Two other comparisons examined third market voluae relative to block
trades on the NYSE, and relative to total purchases and sales by financial
institutions because these two series are indicative of trading by the main
customers of the third market. In both cases there were some unusual trends
in the ratios during the period 1965-1970 due to differential growth. At
the same time, the analysis of both sets of ratios for the periods surrounding
the three changes were all the srjne. Specifically, in all cases there was
no adverse affect after the first change, but all ratios of third market
volume clearly declined after the last :."o changes.
Conclusion
It appears that the prophets of doom r3garding the third market have
been essentially correct thusfar regarding the effect of the commission
changes on the third market. The remaining question is whether the decline
has possibly ended and a certain amount of stability may return although
at a lower rate of relative activity than prevailed during the period
prior to the second change in commissions. Specifically, it has been
suggested that the initial decline on the third market was because
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institutions had fewer ccmmic -on dollars due to the nc^otir-tcd cn-irc..\3ietit
and it was necessary to use these dollars to pay for the research and
support provided by firms that were members of the NYSE. Therefore, more
business than usual went to the Exchange. It is speculated that eventually
the institutions will pay off their commitments to these firms and become
more conscious of execution. Put another way, prior to "May Day" the
institutions had heavy commitments to a large number of research firms that
were paid through NYSE commissions. It is contended that it was a long
process to pay off these commitments and reduce the list of firms receiving
commission business in return for research. Obviously, only further
observations will indicate whether the trough has been reached in this
respect. Unfortunately, the reporting of third market data is quite slow
—
the figures for the fourth quarter of 1976 were not released until the
July, 1977 Statistical Bulletin.
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TABLE 1
THIRD MARKET SALES AS A PERCENT
OF NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE SALES
No. of DOLLAR No. of DOLLAR
SHARES VALUE SHARES VALUE
1st Q 1965 3.1 4.1 1st Q 1973 6.4 7.3
2nd Q 2.8 3.5 2nd Q 5.9 7.2
3rd Q 2.7 3.4 3rd Q 5.3 6.6
4th Q 2.3 2.9 4th Q 5.4 6.6
1st Q 1966 2.5 2.9 1st Q 1974 5.8 7.5
2nd Q 2.4 2.8 2nd Q 5.8 7,8
3rd Q 2.8 2.9 3rd Q 5.0 6.3
4th Q 2.9 3.2 4th Q 4.8 6.3
1st Q 1967 2.7 3.1 1st Q 1975 4.7 5,9
2nd Q 3.0 3.3 *2nd Q 4.9 6.7
3rd q 3.0 3,5 3rd Q 4.4 5.7
4th Q 3.1 3.4 4th Q 4.4 5.7
1st Q 1968 3.5 3.9 1st Q 1976 3.8 4.4
2nd Q 3.2 3.6 2nd Q 4.1 5.4
3rd Q 3.6 4.4 3rd Q 3.6 4.1
4th Q 4.2 4.7 4th Q 3.7 4,7
1st Q 1969 4.0 4.7
2nd Q 4.5 5.1
3rd Q 5.4 5.8
4th Q 5.7 6.4
1st Q 1970 6.4 7.2
2nd Q 5.9 6.9
3rd Q 6.7 8.5
4th Q 7.0 8.6
1st Q 1971 6.3 8.3
*2nd Q 6.8 7.9
3rd Q 7.2 8.3
4th Q 7.8 9.3
1st Q 1972 7.2 8.6
*2nd Q 7.8 9.0
3rd Q 8.3 9.1
4th Q 6.1 7.4
*Indicates quarters when changes were made in cotMisslon structure.
Source: SEC Statistical Bulletin
lAB - .;.- ->::: :y:.d
rj ,.,
!\ !.,
•I'i
iijTjfjM rjc -..i-ixn: -o;, cj. •; j;
•i.:
3--(i.'
J
PQ
<:
nO
O
H
u
PiM
o
>
HW
O
k:
H
HM
H
en
< <
i-l
CO ^5
M
PCH Q
ta
o u
2 W5 W3
M
I
</> CT
.
_,.
• <-c)
4-1
r~ en o o lii f> O CM m r^ f: o^
m It 1 t
vj tn CO c:,A O < r^ 3^ C) 00 m o
r^i C-; <-; l-i <i^ M <J- .M >-. . ••-I iM -e C' 1 CM c ! <-\ 11 . < o in rH C. r-l
c:! rn r-I i-H r—
!
,-I rH r-i .H tH r-; 1-; ,-i rH iH ,-; iH .-1 rH r-; rH . 1 rH rH rH
en CH
"•"'i
.L
•l-M --^
vj CM cn o> o o o -•-• Oi < •) -e : J O c • .-> iM I-- CI Cv; o CM CO un
ro o r~- C3 ro t.-^ c; m c) «a- I.N 'n ^-* CI r s C-l ^^3 r-1 VO CI Cvi CO <
•e^r L-i -a- < o u 1 in ij"i <• -'- '-Ti -vf l-'l vj :.'! . '.n • r c^i CM r:
o-)|
t5
r
oJ C5
-
• c«
iJ —
^
t'j
• 'e>s rj o -<r ><J oj CO c^: .i C3 CJ IM C r^ CO VJ e-, .' ; rs; t 3 v-r rH in r--
^ --^ . „ , • • n • • a • • • • o • • o •^~'
iH CM M rH c? c1 o 1-1 L1 OT m O CTi -M rO <;- ro CO r -. V :, m m (."! <y\
'O « «sj' <J" <t <i" -d- <i- < m en m CO o -<,• o^ , . r"! c-j m ev) c^i c^: CM 1-1 H
)-4
CO
r-I fH rH ,-i cNI CNI ^n! CM c: C) en o'l <r ••;- <t ^• '..-1 L.-1 -n ^n O vO 1,0 o
« r-^ p~ f^ r- ;-» ;-- r- r^ P-- r-» r- 1^ r-- r. r-- :^ r^ I-. :- ;-. r-. I-- :-» r-
»,. "^-^ -*^ -^^ -^^ "*^. '^^. "^^^ ^. "'*-- ""^ ^*-. ""^ **«- ^^ * -^ *"*-. *^ "^ . "'*^. '"-*-. --^ "^"^ ^-^ ***^
u ,-\ r. i en <r I T CM n -<j- .-1 cn: r--) <• rH C\I C^) <,- r-l CM C) <i- rH CM f 1 <!•
a-
<n- :.3
• o
j-i
CLi /-v
:^ 3-5 n CD ^ CN
• • • •
:- CO ;-l o C^ 0^ (^ -V
• • a •
a> i.~, t~~ o CO .-1 O --J-
• • • •
r^ r-- r-l ^
• • • •
1-) JJ CNl O o o C> 00 CO 00 CO 00 CO CO -1 k; '-.3 o cc CO c^ O O >-! CM CM
CO r-I iH ,-i rH tH rH .H rH r^
o-i CM
i
• 6 V LO o o o -tf c% en r- cr\ v_': i^n U'l CO vo c'\ r~ C- r^ cv4 CN] CO m en tr.
P^
« o • •
c-.; 1-1 c. 1-1 O CM o en CN *sj" <1" CTj O in \o o. r7\ CN| 1^ <,>• o o r^ O
TJ « < c'; CNl -d- I—1 CA r^ r~- o vi) v:j "1 o -;J- -J- en c) -V -d- Ln 1/1 VD o \o
M rH .-1 rH ,H >H
Ci
O
^ •
CO en
, CO
w ^-*v O CO CN 00 O 0> CV! L-) • - 0\ rH e^i <!- o o o <r i'^ o c^ r^ o in oi
• B^ • • • • • • e • f • d s ^ • • o • • • • • 9 • «
^ "-^ CO in LO »? cr\ 00 in r-I -Ni iH en .-< c^ o r^ rn <f O IT) in o CM CO
rH o o\ o> o r^ vo vo o ... Ji in -J- If) e^l ~a" en in en <• <j- •<!• in -J- <f
TS eq .-1 tH
}-l
n
•
u
>4 in in i-~i lo ^ vO v£) vO t-» r^ r~ r^ CO 00 00 CO 0\ G\ CJ\ <J\ O o o o
vD vO 'vD >.o O O v£> vD O vo o o vO vD vO O vO >^ vO o r-. r~ r^ r«.
• ^^ ^-^ ^^ ^^^ *-«^ '^^ ^-^ ^-^^ "^ ""**«* ' . ""-^ ^^ ^^ *'-» **^
)-! rH CM fO Vl- iH CM cn -* t-4 CM en -^ rH CM en ^ rH c^^ en < rH CM en <-
-U
O"
:j
cj
vO m
w»'«ri'u^'<,;]»ui.wimiiaj"i">*>L^ .MwswmirW- .! r^ii'.'Jr.'uJi.^^y-jt i-*?' ,-,M-.<wiai» ???gr
^ N WO (ji .j3
"H
'^••.i— ""—
--.-^ rXiV.










